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Abstract
Habitual entrepreneurs are a frequent and important phenomenon in entrepreneurship
and for the economy. We lack, however, a systematic understanding of the advantages
or disadvantages of multiple business ownership and specifically if portfolio and serial
entrepreneurs are different in detecting and exploiting opportunities. Research on
habitual entrepreneurs has mainly focused on a human capital and an organizational
perspective. In order to further advance our understanding of habitual entrepreneurship,
we conducted a case study research focusing on the social capital of habitual
entrepreneurs and on how, by investigating differences between serial and portfolio
entrepreneurs, it is related to the emergence and exploitation of opportunities.
JEL: L26 - Entrepreneurship
Background
Although opportunity emergence is at the heart of entrepreneurship research, a sub-
stantial theoretical fundament remains absent. More in-depth exploration of the
phenomenon is thus required (Suddaby et al. 2015). Habitual entrepreneurs present us
with an opportunity to study opportunity emergence. According to a widely accepted
definition, “habitual founders had established at least one other business prior to the
start-up of the current new independent venture” (Birley and Westhead 1993, p. 40).
Portfolio entrepreneurs are defined as entrepreneurs who are involved in several pro-
jects at the same time (Hall 1995; Westhead et al. 2003) whereas serial entrepreneurs
complete an entrepreneurial project before starting the next one (Rosa and Scott 1999;
Wright et al. 1997). Although they are a frequent and important phenomenon in entre-
preneurship and for the economy, we lack a systematic understanding of the advan-
tages or disadvantages of multiple business ownership: “How do habitual entrepreneurs
search for and identify new opportunities? What factors influence the decision to pursue
such opportunities? Do entrepreneurs with business ownership experience perform better
than those without such experience?” (Ucbasaran et al. 2006, p. 2). The study of habitual
entrepreneurs thus offers an opportunity to explore the emergence and exploitation of
opportunities (MacMillan 1986).
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Research on habitual entrepreneurs has mainly focused on a human capital and an
organizational perspective. The human capital perspective tries to answer important
questions concerning how specific entrepreneurial experiences can give habitual entrepre-
neurs an advantage over novice entrepreneurs (Amaral et al. 2009; Ucbasaran et al. 2006).
The organizational perspective tries to understand the mechanisms of the development of
business groups and how business groups enable growth for habitual entrepreneurs
(Iacobucci and Rosa 2005, 2010; Lechner and Leyronas 2009; Rosa and Scott 1999).
We extend this approach by focusing on the social capital of habitual entrepreneurs
and by distinguishing how social capital has different roles for serial and portfolio en-
trepreneurs in the case of opportunity emergence and exploitation.
There are two main streams for explaining opportunity emergence: discovery and
construction. While we will not enter into the debate on whether they are substitutes
or complements (see Suddaby et al. 2015), habitual entrepreneurs can be studied from
both perspectives. On the one hand, it can be argued that the unique experience of ha-
bitual entrepreneurs allows them to see opportunities that cannot be seen by others
through a form of imprinting (Mathias et al. 2015), but on the other hand, they are also
more capable of acting upon their environment in order to construct opportunities
(Alvarez et al. 2015). However, we do not know exactly why and how habitual entre-
preneurs come to be convinced of the existence of new opportunities and how they
exploit them.
Three important themes emerge when we extend the opportunity emergence ques-
tion to habitual entrepreneurship: how did the opportunity originate (the question of
opportunity origin), how was the team built (the question of team building), and how
were the resources attracted (the question of resource attraction)?
A number of studies have contributed to understand the phenomenon of the habitual
entrepreneur (Wiklund and Shepherd 2008). For the most part, these dealt with the dif-
ferences between novice and habitual entrepreneurs (Hsu 2003, 2005; Iacobucci 2002;
Westhead and Wright 1998, 1999; Westhead et al. 2003). However, despite the positive
influences one would expect from having previously participated in entrepreneurial
projects, empirical evidence of a positive correlation between habitual entrepreneurship
and corporate success is rather inconclusive (Carter and Ram 2003; Schollhammer 1991).
To be able to assess the influence of these groups on the success of ventures, another per-
spective is helpful. The focus shifts here from the comparison and examination of the
similarities and differences between novice and habitual entrepreneurs to asking the ques-
tion of why and how habitual entrepreneurs are different when acting upon emerging op-
portunities in terms of their social capital.
Moreover, research tends to view habitual entrepreneurs as a rather homogeneous group
neglecting to account for differences in experience (e.g., the number of ventures created
and their outcome) or entrepreneurial processes (Kirschenhofer and Lechner 2012).
Therefore, the exploration of differences between serial and portfolio entrepreneurs based
on their social capital appears a fruitful route of inquiry.
A critical assessment of the state of the field in entrepreneurship called for more
qualitative research to generate new theory about opportunity emergence (Suddaby
et al. 2015). Given the type of questions (how and why) and the novelty of these ques-
tions in research on habitual entrepreneurs, we opted for a case study methodology
(Yin 2003). The case findings show that opportunities leading to new venturing emerge
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differently for portfolio and serial entrepreneurs. Portfolio entrepreneurs can rely on a
wider weak tie network and new venturing is more based on continuous relationships
and obligations while serial entrepreneurs can make more radical, riskier choices
accepting the inherent uncertainty in the new venture.
Review of the guiding literature
Opportunity emergence1 and social capital
Entrepreneurship is about recognizing an opportunity and exploiting that opportunity
(Shane and Venkataraman 2000). The ability to identify and select opportunities prior
to their execution plays an important role and is an important characteristic of an
entrepreneur (Vaghely and Julien 2010). The recognition of opportunities is related to
alertness to opportunities and knowledge of markets and customers (Baron 2006).
Habitual entrepreneurs seem thus be in an advantageous position to recognise oppor-
tunities. Indeed, habitual entrepreneurs identify more opportunities than novice en-
trepreneurs (Ucbasaran et al. 2003b). Due to their previous experience, they are
potentially better able to assess opportunities and thus to differentiate between infer-
ior and superior opportunities. However, opportunity emergence and exploitation is
rarely the outcome of isolated processes within a company (Roininen and Ylinenpää
2010) but require the access and or acquisition of appropriate resources (McGrath
and MacMillan 2000). The access to resources is possible because of the development
of social networks (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986). Social networks are the potentially
most valuable relationships that an entrepreneur or the entrepreneurial team holds:
they help to identify business opportunities and attract human and financial resources
but also to gain legitimacy (Lechner and Dowling 2003; Stam 2010).
The value of social networks can be summarized under the concept of social capital the-
ory that is “used to describe the instrumental benefits of social relationships” (Aldrich and
Martinez 2001, p.47). Social capital is defined as “resources embedded in a social structure
which are or accessed and/or mobilized in purposive action” (Lin 1999, p.35). Social cap-
ital is created through investment in social relationships, leading to the creation of socially
embedded resources that can be mobilized by individuals (Lin 1999). Social capital allows
therefore to achieve objectives that were otherwise difficult to obtain based on the as-
sumption that the social resources of entrepreneurs are more important than the posses-
sion of personal resources (Lin 1999).
In this sense, habitual entrepreneurs had the possibility through past entrepreneurial ex-
perience to develop social capital. It has been argued that network partners from previous
projects play an important role for the identification and exploitation of new opportun-
ities (Ucbasaran et al. 2003b). That means that social capital developed in previous ven-
tures should positively influence opportunity emergence. Networks have an important
function for entrepreneurs. They help to overcome disadvantages ensuing from “newness”
and “size problems” (Hart et al. 1995; Lechner 2003; Stinchcombe 1965) by making re-
sources available (Baum et al. 2000; Johannisson 1987; Wisnieski and Dowling 1997). The
use of external resources can reduce the risk for the entrepreneur in the entrepreneurial
project and increase the chances of success (Starr and MacMillan 1990). In this sense, net-
works can be both a means of discovering or constructing opportunities, as well as a way
to see more or construct more (see, e.g., Alvarez et al. 2015).
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Granovetter (1973, 1974, 1995) divides the relationships between the network players
into weak and strong ties, according to their intensity. Within the strong tie framework,
in-depth information and resources are exchanged (Brüderl and Preisendörfer 1998;
Hoang and Antoncic 2003). Weaker ties frequently provide access to newer and more
diverse information (De Koning and Muzyka 1996) and connect different groups in a
sub-network (Granovetter 1973). The important aspect seems to be a balanced rela-
tionship between weak and strong ties (Krackhardt 1992) as even though strong ties
guarantee faster access to important information and resources, weak ties prevent the
network from becoming isolated from the outside world (Lechner et al. 2006). Diversi-
fied networks consist of bridging ties that connect an entrepreneur to different groups
or communities (Granovetter 1973; McEvily and Zaheer 1999). Diversified networks
can provide diversified resources (Burt 1992).
Research assumes that habitual entrepreneurs have developed superior social capital
compared to novice entrepreneurs as they have already had the chance to build up
these networks in previous projects for use in subsequent ventures (Lamont 1972;
McGrath 1996; Starr and Bygrave 1991). This begins with the identification of new op-
portunities that are either brought to the attention of the habitual entrepreneur via the
network or are further developed with the help of network partners (McGrath 1996;
Ucbasaran et al. 2003b). In addition, the existing networks are beneficial to habitual en-
trepreneurs for the recruitment of suitable staff (Hsu 2004; Iacobucci and Rosa 2004)
and for the financing of the new project with external capital (Hsu 2003; Scott and
Rosa 1996; Westhead et al. 2003).
Network connections do not, however, always have a positive effect on the success of
a project. Particularly in the case of previously successful entrepreneurs, strong ties can
lead to the formation of “clubs” where the members have known each other for a long
time and support each other time and time again, without adapting to changing envir-
onmental conditions (Starr and Bygrave 1991). This makes the identification of novel
opportunities using network partners more difficult as these are often conveyed by
weak ties (De Koning and Muzyka 1996; Harrison et al. 2001). Despite the existing re-
search, it is not clear how habitual entrepreneurs actually use their social capital for
identifying opportunities and whether opportunity emergence is different for serial and
portfolio entrepreneurs.
Execution of the opportunity and social capital
Following the identification and positive assessment of an opportunity, it must be exe-
cuted to move the entrepreneurial project from the planning to the implementation
phase. It is the execution of this step that differentiates entrepreneurs from people who
have never run a business (McMullen and Shepherd 2006). Habitual entrepreneurs go
one step further; they execute more than one opportunity during their lifetime (Rosa
and Scott 1999; Ucbasaran et al. 2006).
But which capabilities and resources can be transferred from one project to the other
by habitual entrepreneurs? And which of them have a positive effect on the success of
the new project? Timmons and Spinelli (2003) describe the entrepreneurial process as
a balanced interaction between the opportunity, the team, and the resources. Experi-
enced entrepreneurs in particular tend to cooperate more with larger teams to
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implement opportunities than novice entrepreneurs (McKelvie and Cedere 2001). By
involving more team members, additional experience, knowledge, and know-how can
be integrated into the project. Portfolio entrepreneurs in particular can overcome the
limiting factor “time” by integrating additional partners (Iacobucci and Rosa 2004,
2010; Lechner and Leyronas 2009). Time is apparently critical for portfolio entrepre-
neurs in the process of implementing a new opportunity or new activities because, on
average, they need longer to execute new activities than “serial” or “novice entrepre-
neurs” (Alsos and Kolvereid 1998). On the other hand, portfolio entrepreneurs can use
resources from their current ventures for their new projects, especially support func-
tions. This lowers costs and provides professional know-how for the project (Carter
and Ram 2003). But the problem of time usually remains for the portfolio entrepre-
neurs because they are often still involved in the executive management of the current
venture. Some of the portfolio entrepreneurs create business groups to overcome the
organizational problems of managing more the one venture at the same time (Iacobucci
and Rosa 2010; Lechner and Leyronas 2009).
According to the resources-based view, entrepreneurial opportunities exist because
potential players in a market have access to different resources and have different ideas
about the value and the transformation of these resources into new products and ser-
vices (Shane and Venkataraman 2000). Access to different resources and ideas is largely
a function of social capital. Entrepreneurs who are able to gain access to more re-
sources are more successful than others (McKelvie and Cedere 2001). Habitual entre-
preneurs do have better access to resources (Westhead et al. 2004). They can use their
social that they built up during their previous entrepreneurial projects, human re-
sources, other assets, and, if a previous project was successful, they bring in financial
resources (Carter and Ram 2003). But the question of how and under which circum-
stances habitual entrepreneurs use these resources has not yet been answered nor
whether serial and portfolio entrepreneurs differ in regards of social capital.
In essence, it is not clear what role social capital plays for opportunity emergence
and exploitation of serial and portfolio entrepreneurs.
Case studies description of habitual entrepreneurs
Entrepreneur A—portfolio entrepreneur
Entrepreneur A joined his family’s media company in the late 1980s. In 1996, he be-
came the managing director. To this day, the company’s core business is the publica-
tion of newspapers. However, entrepreneur A diversified the activities by founding
companies responsible for the expansion and reorganization of the core business and
other activities, such as investments and hobbies. Altogether, he was involved in the
founding of eight entrepreneurial firms (PA2 to PA9). In 2003, the publishing house had
a turnover of 85 million €, employed 550 full-time and approx. 5000 part-time workers,
who were mainly involved in distribution.
In 1993, entrepreneur A set up a marketing firm within the publishing house for the
development, printing, and distribution of advertising material in his region (PA1 is
entrepreneur A’s first project). Some years later, he set up a 60/40 venture with a news-
paper company in a neighboring region to increase the potential number of households
reached by the marketing company. In 2002, the group then took over a regional post
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provider (PA3). In addition to this, the company holds minority shares in a television
station as well as two radio stations and supports a number of social organizations. In
1999, entrepreneur A reorganized the ownership structures of the publishing house. An
additional company was set up, not for “entrepreneurial activities,” but more to work
around legal- and tax-related problems. The third area where entrepreneur A is entre-
preneurially active can be described as “other activities, investments and hobbies out-
side of the family firm.” In 1998, he set up a leasing company for machines and cars
with a long-time friend and experts from the motor car industry (PA5).
Entrepreneur A set up a further company in the film industry (PA6). The company
was set up in the USA with a partner who had experience in the branch and mainly
produced crime and action films. Following the fusion with a competitor, the annual
turnover of the company was approx. 28 million USD. At this point in time, the owners
had set their sights on a successful stock market launch. Following the turbulences in
the financial market in 2001, the company was plagued by financial problems and had
to file for bankruptcy. This was the only project that entrepreneur A was involved in
that failed and had to be written off completely. Entrepreneur A was though still active
in two other fields. One of the projects invested in real estate within the region and
rented out, among other things, office and storage space to the leasing company (PA5)
and the publishing house. Entrepreneur A’s most recent project involves alternative en-
ergy (PA8). These investments are also carried out with a partner with the necessary
market expertise.
Entrepreneur A invests in different companies in different branches. His personal
principles are very important to him here. His investing in a new product is dependent
on a great number of criteria. A very important criterion is having a partner with mar-
ket knowledge and experience in the branch who is willing to act as managing director
of the new company. The partner normally has holdings in the firm, but entrepreneur
A usually holds the majority.
When asked why he has invested in different fields, after brief consideration, entre-
preneur A replied, “I have four children and each of them should have the opportunity
to work in our family firm in an area that interests them.”
Entrepreneur B—the serial entrepreneur
Entrepreneur B has set up four businesses in the last 36 years. The first business was in
the building industry (PB1 [for the first project by entrepreneur B]), the second one was
in the furniture industry (PB2), and the current one is in the travel industry (PB3). In
addition, entrepreneur B was involved in the setting up of a marketing firm that is still
in existence (PB4) and which developed out of PB3.
In 1969, entrepreneur B set up a business for renovating concrete components
on buildings and tunnels. In return for his willingness to try out a new chemical,
the supplier paid the bill for a year. The rest of the finances were covered by a
bank loan and personal loans from two friends. During the boom period, the com-
pany virtually held the monopoly in this niche market in the large cities of West
Germany and employed more than 60 people. During the late 1970s and the early
1980s of the last century, the market changed as a result of the shift from public
sector customers to private customers with poor payment practices, and a sink in
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the average quantity of orders. These changes in the market conditions led to a
higher bureaucratic burden and a decrease in entrepreneur B’s satisfaction. He sold
the business in 1984.
Following the sale of (PB1), entrepreneur B visited a furniture congress in Milan with
a partner and then spontaneously set up a business to import Italian designer leather
furniture (PB2). He invested the complete sales proceeds from (PB1) as equity. The fur-
niture was supplied by an Italian producer network and sold by entrepreneur B in three
shops in different large German cities. The business should have been declared bank-
rupt, but entrepreneur B opted to fulfill all of his obligations to customers, employees,
and shop owners. Legal disputes with the Italian suppliers were not successful on ac-
count of bankruptcies and diverse restructurings and new start-ups among the Italian
firms. Entrepreneur B lost his entire fortune and was almost penniless in 1987. He him-
self views this basically negative experience as an enriching experience which, in turn,
had a positive influence on the start up project that followed. In future, he will, for ex-
ample, no longer make himself dependent on external business partners but will con-
nect them to new projects by creating win-win situations.
While visiting New Zealand, entrepreneur B and two additional people developed the
idea of customized trips to New Zealand. The two partners from New Zealand set up
firms in New Zealand and Australia, while entrepreneur B and a partner set up a busi-
ness in Germany to canvass for customers. At this point in time, none of the four part-
ners had any experience in the travel branch. In 2004, the firm had a turnover of 15
million Euro and operated at a profit. At the beginning of 2005, the firm employed 32
people. In the same year, a further six jobs were created and more office space was
rented and developed.
In 1998, a marketing firm (PB4) was set up as a 100 % subsidiary of (PB3). This firm
was not set up to access new areas of business or additional growth for the business or
parent company, but to outsource some marketing activities to profit from certain
market conditions, such as discounts from publishers for agencies. Entrepreneur
B’s motivation is the desire for independence. In his own words, money is import-
ant for implementing business projects and making growth possible. Personal
wealth though is not that important to him and not a motivation behind his entre-
preneurial activities.
Entrepreneur C—portfolio entrepreneur
Entrepreneur C founded his first company in 1990 in the food sector as a solo entre-
preneur. The project did not take off and he sold the company to a local investor with-
out recovering his initial investment. In 1995, he started another company in the food
sector in southwest France with his wife and brother-in-law. The company was the re-
sult of their previous unsuccessful venture and they joined forces. It had sales of about
$200,000 in its first year and reached breakeven in its second year of existence. Over a
10-year period, entrepreneur C, as the main driver of activities, added three new ven-
tures in the food business and reached a sales level of $ 130 million. In 2010, the entre-
preneurs ventured into the hospitality service industry by creating their first hotel,
followed by a second in 2012. Finally, he created a new venture for complementary ser-
vices for hotels.
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Entrepreneur D—serial entrepreneur
Entrepreneur D created his first venture with a friend in 2003; given his personal inter-
est in China, the company was dedicated to importing activities from there. In 2005, he
joined a Master’s program in entrepreneurship in France. The same year, he ceded his
participation to his former partner and left the business. He met an engineer in the
Master’s program who was interested in doing business in China and in 2006, together
with a Chinese partner, they started a consulting company for French companies look-
ing for engineering solutions in China. Due to unresolved conflicts with his partner
about the strategic direction of the firm, he left the company in 2008. He then created
a firm with three former classmates that had started an import business from China.
The company specialized in services and products for university ceremonies. It tar-
geted the French market and reached 2 million € in sales within 3 years. In 2011, he
and another partner left the firm to dedicate themselves to other activities. The other
partner took over his family business while entrepreneur D became interested in rea-
sonable, alternative, and sustainable food production. He explored the idea for about
a year and started the new venture in 2012, adding a partner with technical compe-
tences in the same year.
Social capital and the emergence of new opportunities by habitual
entrepreneurs
In the following, we will use entrepreneurs A and B as the main cases and entrepre-
neurs C and D as complementing, control cases.
Entrepreneur A’s network
Entrepreneur A had developed strong social capital that has led to a wide and di-
verse network. He enjoys a high social standing as the publisher of the newspaper
with the highest circulation in a medium-sized city. He is active in diverse social
organizations and is involved in volunteer work within and outside the region,
leading to an increasing network of strong and weak ties. In his hometown, he
does at times feel the “envy” of those around him, which makes him very careful
when choosing business partners and limits the number of potential partners. He
also avoids doing business with close friends as he does not want business prob-
lems to weigh on the friendship.
Entrepreneur A divides business partners into “real business partners,” who bring in
project-specific knowledge, and “supporting partners.” “Real business partners” are
those ties that leverage-specific resources and competences without which a project
could not be carried out. The “supporting partners,” such as lawyers, and consultants,
who mainly provide supporting and rather business-general services, are, in the entre-
preneur’s perception, relatively easy to replace. Many of these “supporting tasks,” being
also considered generic enough, are taken on by internal departments within the pub-
lishing house.
The number of potential business partners identified by entrepreneur A is limited
due to the narrow regional focus and the concentration on certain areas of business.
Thus, for the joint venture involving the distribution of advertising material in the
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neighboring region, there was only one potential partner who could provide 100 % ac-
cess to the households in the region.
Generally, the number of potential business partners per project is very limited. A
further reason for the low number of potential business partners (except in the case of
PA6) is the fact that entrepreneur A mostly develops his business ideas with partners
from his existing networks. All companies are based on a relationship of trust between
entrepreneur A and his partners. A high number of weak ties make it possible for him
to search the market for business concepts. Before he invests money though, he trans-
forms these weak ties into strong ones. To do this, entrepreneur A invests time in
building up trust in potential partners. Even before the implementation of the actual
“entrepreneurial” projects, he carries our small business transactions with his future
partners to check their professional qualifications. If the potential partner is not pre-
pared to invest time in cementing the ties, then entrepreneur A will abort the project if
need be. Using this approach, entrepreneur A develops such strong partnerships that
the reputation of the branch and business partner becomes less important for him. It
appears that the existence of a business group as a form of portfolio entrepreneurship
influences the choice of relational properties when carrying out new ventures. The rela-
tional properties in this sense are the predominance of strong ties in the business part-
ner network. Developing strong ties requires interaction over time. Thus, the time
leading up to the entrepreneurial event is lengthened (Table 1).
During the eight projects, the active network of business partners was not very stable
(see Table 1). With the exception of the activities within the publishing house, invest-
ments were in non-related business fields. As entrepreneur A does not have any special
knowledge of these markets, he seeks business partners who have knowledge of and ex-
perience in this field to gain a competitive advantage. The supporting network is how-
ever relatively stable. Nevertheless, entrepreneur A does not want to be completely
dependent on these partners. They are categorically replaceable.
Entrepreneur A’s motivation is not purely of a monetary nature. He does, of course,
expect good returns and sets high expectations for each project, which have to be abso-
lutely satisfied. At the same time though, family and social awareness also play an im-
portant role. For entrepreneur A, the social network is the most important factor for
finding business ideas. A great number of weak ties lead to a high flow of informa-
tion. His networks provide contact to a vast number of potential entrepreneurs in
different branches. The identification, selection, and development of new opportun-
ities is guided by his knowledge and experience in the core business, his instinct
for opportunities, his beliefs and hobbies, and his entrepreneurial mindset. He is
Table 1 Entrepreneur A’s network
Project
PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 PA6 PA7 PA8
Business partners and “supporting” partners
according to importance
1st AA AA AA AA FA HA FA GA
2nd BA CA DA GA IA GA
3rd EA KA GA KA
4th JA
Partner AA brother of entrepreneur A, Partner BA newspaper from a bordering region, Partner CA previous owner of the
company, Partner DA tax consultant 1, Partner EA members of the family, Partner FA friend, specialist in the automotive
industry, Partner GA three banks, Partner HA friend, Partner IA investment funds, Partner JA lawyers, Partner KA tax consultant 2
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able to bring his knowledge, experience, or, at the very least, his interests into
every project.
The team concept is important within the implementation framework. At the
start of every project, entrepreneur A looks for a partner with market knowledge,
experience, and, if possible, technical know-how. As a result of most of the invest-
ments being of a local or at least regional character, he is better able to assess his
partner. The only investment that did not take place in southern Germany was
not successful.
Entrepreneur A allows for enough time to establish strong ties with business partners.
This helps him to assess the character, knowledge, and market experience of the part-
ner, and also to understand the branch itself. He invests equally in both the business
idea and the business partner. This trust building process can take months, or even
years. Alongside his network, entrepreneur A contributes a wealth of material and non-
material resources to the project. In addition to financial resources, he also provides
support from the specialist departments in the publishing house.
In this case study, the stability of different networks varied. Two types of rela-
tionship were particularly steady. One was the close family relationship, the other
the steady financial network. In 50 % of his projects, he worked with these part-
ners. All of the large German banks and additional regional banks can be found in
his hometown. Nevertheless, he mainly works with three banks and combines their
loans in a project. The financial network appears to be relatively steady. It is com-
prised though of several partners to avoid being dependent on one partner alone.
It was the network of partners with experience in the branch that proved to be
less stable. In the case of entrepreneur A, this is due to the high degree of diversi-
fication in the projects.
Entrepreneur B’s network
The activated network partners of entrepreneur B were absolutely independent of each
other (except in PB4) in each individual business start-up. With the start up of PB1 and
PB2, the great distance in time (15 years) between the ventures is sure to have played
an important role for the changes within the networks. However, the complete network
of activated partners also changed between PB2 and PB3. These changes can be traced
back to the completely different business areas and the failure of PB2 (Table 2).
Table 2 Entrepreneur B’s network explanation of terms
Projects
PB1 PB2 PB3 PB4
Business partners and “supporting” partners
according to importance
1st AB FB HB IB





Partner AB German chemical company, Partner BB public client, Partner CB bank, Partner DB two friends (creditors), Partner
EB US chemical company, Partner FB co-founder of company PB2, Partner GB Italian partner, Partner HB two partners in
New Zealand and Australia, Partner IB co-founder
Lechner et al. Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship  (2016) 5:28 Page 10 of 23
For PB1, entrepreneur B’s networks played an important role in the identification of
opportunities and the financing. When setting up firm PB2, entrepreneur B’s private
network was the driving force in identifying the opportunity. Without his partner (re-
ferred to in the table representing entrepreneur B’s networks as FB), this opportunity
would never have caught his attention. At the same time, the network was the critical
weakness and caused the failure of the business model. The network was too small at
the critical point, and this led to a dependence on a few partners in the area of produc-
tion. The network also played an important role during the setting up of the third firm
PB3. Together with partners from the existing network, to whom there were strong ties,
the opportunity was identified and implemented. PB4 was set up solely for a cost-
efficient handling of existing processes. It should be noted that the members of the
founding team of PB2 and PB3 had no experience in the specific industries. Their exist-
ing networks were also not able to contribute this experience.
What is striking is the ability of entrepreneur B to identify market niches in different
business fields. His strong entrepreneurial mindset allows him to analyze his idea very
quickly and develop opportunities. He then reacts very quickly to the situation and
finds suitable partners within a short space of time, motivates them, and gets them in-
volved. Entrepreneur B’s personal network was the decisive element for the identifica-
tion of opportunities in all start-ups (except PB4).
The creation of the start-up team was less systematic and not necessarily based on
complementarity of competences. In two of the three start-ups, (PB2 and PB3), friends
were involved in the project as co-founders (the firm PB4 is not treated as an independ-
ent venture here). However, he is able to build up effective support networks at very
short notice. Entrepreneur B’s networks proved to be very unstable during the start-ups
PB1, PB2, and PB3. This could be due to the long period of time between the projects
PB1 and PB2. It could also be the result of the failure of PB2 as well as the very different
branches in PB2 and PB3. Entrepreneur B hardly ever transfers resources from one pro-
ject to another.
Entrepreneur C’s network
Similar to entrepreneur A, the partner network of entrepreneur C is relatively small
across the ventures. After a first attempt as a solo entrepreneur, C joined forces with
his wife and brother in law in the food distribution business (PC1), relying mainly on
suppliers for production and concentrating on marketing and distribution. PC2 was an
extension of PC1 since it consisted in setting up a production company. For this ven-
ture, the initial team remained the same but a new partner competent in production
was added. Financing was secured by a new bank. The search of the new partner took
about 18 months since entrepreneur C wanted to be sure to find a trustful partner. PC2
allowed the firm to penetrate better the food market, differentiate from the competition
and let to substantial growth. Being the CEO of these companies allowed C to get more
and more involved in the local business ecosystem participating in various support ac-
tivities for young entrepreneurs, an entrepreneurs business club, and other associations
that were functional for the existing businesses but also for the emergence of new op-
portunities. Thus, C was able to develop a large weak tie network. PC3 was again in the
food business. The business idea was brought to C by a former supplier and competitor
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with whom he created the company. PC4 was in the education business, an idea
brought to C by a long-standing business contact. Even if this business was in a new
domain, the same bank continued to finance the venture as a demonstration of the
strong relationship develop between C and the bank. This was even more true for PC5
and PC6 after PC4 had failed. These last two ventures were started by C with his wife
and their daughters in the hotel and hotel service business.
C’s partner network is characterized by a high stability involving usually family mem-
bers. C tends to complement the team with partners that bring missing competences to
the new venture. Generally, these partners have been known for a long time. The initial
success of C in the food business has led to stable financing relationships. C relied for
five ventures on the same financing partner.
Entrepreneur D’s network
Entrepreneur D’s new ventures were literally new ventures. Co-founders and financing
partners of this serial entrepreneur changed from venture to venture. PD1 involved a
close friend and his father for financing. PD2 was linked to a change in his life when he
went back to higher education where he met partners for the next venture. From PD2,
he carried over a founding partner and teamed up with another former classmate to
launch PD3. When in entrepreneur D’s view, this business became too routinized, he
existed PD3 and launched PD4. For this innovative food business, he teamed up with a
PhD in nutrition.
Generally, D’s different ventures relied on different partner networks. New venturing
is characterized by strong discontinuities that are partly due to changes in lifestyle but
also D’s general attitude to seek out for new challenges. When creating a new venture,
D is willing to accept that he enters again in heaving learning situation that he needs to
develop a business from scratch without relying on past relationships or achievements
(Tables 3 and 4).
Results and discussion
Case conclusions: social capital and the emergence of opportunities
The portfolio entrepreneurs are frequently confronted with ideas about new opportun-
ities emerging from their weak tie networks. Together with the future partners, they
develop opportunities from ideas and are very conscious of their role and the role of
their partners (compare, e.g., Ardichvili et al. 2003; Baron 2006). They only participate
Table 3 Entrepreneur C’s network
Project
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6
Business partners and “supporting” partners according
to importance
1st AC AC BC AC AC AC
2nd BC BC FC IC IC LC
3rd CC DC GC DC KC IC
4th EC DC DC KC
5th DC
Partner AC wife of entrepreneur C, Partner BC brother-in-law, Partner CC bank 1, Partner DC bank 2, Partner EC co-founder 1,
Partner FC co-founder 2, Partner GC ex-competitor, co-founder 3, Partner HC friend, co-founder 4, Partner IC co-founder 5,
Partner JC daughter 1, Partner KC daughter 2, Partner LC co-founder 5
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in projects of which they have a basic understanding. Some of the opportunities, in the
case of entrepreneur A, such as the establishment of delivery services for advertising
material, could possibly have been implemented within the existing firm. The same
reasoning applies also for the first three and last three ventures of entrepreneur C
(food industry, hospitality services). As has been found in research on business
groups (Lechner and Leyronas 2009), risk diversification and resource attraction are
explaining factors. Several small units reduce the risk for the entire business struc-
ture (Sarasvathy and Menon 2004; Westhead and Wright 1999). In addition, tax-
and family-related issues also play an important role for entrepreneur A (Birley and
Westhead 1993; Donckels et al. 1987; Westhead and Wright 1998).
Entrepreneur B, on the other hand, comes across ideas almost by chance. He can
familiarize himself quickly with the subject and develop the idea into an opportunity
without any great assistance. He is very enthusiastic and relies largely on intuition for
identifying opportunities. He does not analyze the opportunities to death (McGrath
and MacMillan 2000, p. 3). He implements opportunities that interest him with the re-
sources at hand or opportunities that have originated through a series of coincidences
(Baker and Nelson 2005; Lechner and Kirschenhofer 2004). Entrepreneur D moves
along changing lines of interest, accepting of being in a substantial learning situation in
a new venture and adapting relatively fast to new contexts.
Opportunities are presented to both portfolio entrepreneurs several times a year by
their networks. The network also plays an important role in the search for opportun-
ities for the serial entrepreneurs. However, the opportunities are not specifically pre-
sented by their network of weak ties. Rather, they develop them, whether by choice or
coincidence, with partners from their networks who are connected to them by weak or
strong ties. In contrast to the portfolio entrepreneurs, the serial entrepreneurs do not
make use of tried and trusted routines to identify and test opportunities. The lack of
pre-existing structure (such as a business group) allows for more deliberate and spon-
taneous choices for serial entrepreneurs. The cases also suggest that serial entrepre-
neurs are resigned to entering a new venture in a substantial learning situation
(Gibb and Ritchie 1982).
In contrast, the portfolio entrepreneurs could use their reputation as a permanent
entrepreneur to encourage potential entrepreneurs to present them with new oppor-
tunities. The serial entrepreneurs, on the other hand, participating in only one project
at a time and, in the case of A, with relatively long periods of time between projects,
do not have the reputation of being open to new projects at all times. To some extent,
portfolio entrepreneurs are identified in a theoretical habitual entrepreneurs popula-
tions as active while the serial entrepreneurs are only latent in the intervals between
Table 4 Entrepreneur D’s network
Projects
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4
Business partners and “supporting” partners
according to importance
1st AD CD DD HD
2nd BD DD FD ID
3rd ED GD JD
Partner AD friend, co-founder 1, Partner BD father (financer), Partner CD study colleague, co-founder 2, Partner DD study
colleague, co-founder 3, Partner ED bank 1, Partner FD study colleague, co-founder 4, Partner GD bank 2, Partner HD
researcher, co-founder 5, Partner ID business angel, investor, Partner JD venture capitalist, investor
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ventures. The fact that the serial entrepreneurs are presented with fewer opportunities
compared to the portfolio entrepreneurs could be the result of the lower number of
weak ties. Entrepreneur A has a very extensive network of weak ties as a result of his
reputation throughout the region, his volunteer work, and his interregional activities.
It is similar with entrepreneur C, who is involved regularly in coaching projects for
young entrepreneurs.
In terms of the individual projects, the networks of the entrepreneurs can be divided
into three groups: (1) the direct project network, (2) the network of weak ties that is in-
volved in the project, and (3) the rest of the social network. The question, though, is
what role do these individual networks play in future projects? According to the litera-
ture, habitual entrepreneurs use the direct project network to discover and implement
new opportunities (Ucbasaran et al. 2003b). The case studies could not confirm this as-
sumption. In the case of the portfolio entrepreneurs, opportunities were mostly pre-
sented by their weak ties. While the serial entrepreneur B did develop them with
network partners, except in the case of firm PB4, which was developed to support firm
PB3, it was not with partners from the direct partner networks of previous projects.
Serial entrepreneur D was also developing new teams for each venture. In this sense,
portfolio entrepreneurship increases the in-degree of ties (i.e., networking occurs, in-
formation flows from the outside in), while serial entrepreneurs need to constantly in-
crease the outdegree of ties in order to have sufficiently rich networks. This finding
adds an explanation to other research that found that portfolio entrepreneurship facil-
itates the attraction of resources (Lechner and Leyronas 2009).
The business network of an entrepreneur starts with his personal network. During his
entrepreneurial activity, he expands this, and the business network increases in import-
ance (Baum et al. 2000; Lipparini and Sobrero 1997). The growth of the network leads to
an increase in the number of weak ties (Lechner and Dowling 2003; Witt 2004). Strong
ties provide in-depth information and resources (Brüderl and Preisendörfer 1998; Hoang
and Antoncic; 2003); weak ties, on the other hand, provide new information (De Koning
and Muzyka 1996). However, bridging ties lead to new information for new oppor-
tunities. For portfolio entrepreneurs, the cases clearly suggest that an extensive net-
work of weak ties has a positive effect on the number of opportunities. Over the
course of many years, both portfolio entrepreneurs built up their networks through
professional activities and volunteer work. New opportunities are presented to the
portfolio entrepreneurs by their network of weak ties several times a year.
Alongside the question of the influence of the direct project network from previous
projects on the identification of opportunities is the issue of what effect these contacts
have on the success of the implementation. In principle, portfolio entrepreneurs in par-
ticular, as a result of their activities, have the opportunity to build up an extensive net-
work of strong ties and to transfer these ties from one project to the next (Alsos and
Carter 2003). Entrepreneur A makes use of this in two ways. First of all, he always of-
fers his brother the chance to participate in the implementation of opportunities. He
frequently takes supporting partners from one project into another, e.g., the three banks
that have been financial backers of 50 % of his projects. Entrepreneur C has a similar
pattern with an increasingly stable financing network and involving family members in
project. Both serial entrepreneurs, on the other hand, did not re-involve any important
partners in the implementation of their serial projects.
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The stability of the core businesses of the portfolio entrepreneur with a changing per-
iphery of businesses influences the startup of firms and the choice of the partners. It re-
quires more stable foundations (strong ties) and less radical changes compared to the
new ventures of a serial entrepreneur, where every new venture is potentially isolated
without any necessary relations to the previous ones. Therefore portfolio entrepreneurs
have access to more and more diverse resources since their ongoing ventures allowed
them to build stronger social capital; serial entrepreneurs need to develop more actively
social capital after having shown interest in new opportunities. Put in other words:
Portfolio entrepreneurs can already mobilize resources from relationships while serial
entrepreneurs need to invest more in relationships. However, the existing stock of
social capital of the portfolio entrepreneurs and the need to continue investing in
and maintaining existing relationships reduce their action autonomy. Serial entre-
preneurs need to also have greater freedom to develop new social capital. Portfolio
entrepreneurs remain somehow indebted to the existing social capital. The existing
social capital creates also the reputation of portfolio entrepreneurs making them
generally more risk-averse than serial entrepreneurs.
Proposition 1 Portfolio entrepreneurs are presented with opportunities by their
networks more frequently than serial entrepreneurs, i.e., the in-degree of network
relationships is higher for portfolio entrepreneurs compared to serial entrepre-
neurs. Potentially, portfolio entrepreneurs have larger weak tie networks than ser-
ial entrepreneurs.
Proposition 2 Past project partners have a lower probability to be involved in the identi-
fication and exploitation of new opportunities for serial than for portfolio entrepreneurs.
Proposition 3a Choices in setting up new ventures are more moderate and continuous
for portfolio entrepreneurs compared to the possibility of serial entrepreneurs who have
more autonomy to break with the past.
Proposition 3b Choices in setting up new ventures are more moderate and continuous
for portfolio entrepreneurs: Generally, portfolio entrepreneurs will be less risk-friendly
than serial entrepreneurs.
Cross-case conclusions: how habitual entrepreneurs implement opportunities
Successful habitual entrepreneurs mostly implement the opportunities together with part-
ners (Donckels et al. 1987). In all four case studies, the direct project network was relatively
small for serial and portfolio entrepreneurs. Teams play very different roles in the imple-
mentation of opportunities for the two types of habitual entrepreneurs. The portfolio entre-
preneurs are dependent on the building of teams as they mostly do not have the necessary
market knowledge or the time for implementation. Thus, the partners are more strongly
involved in the operative management of the company. The portfolio entrepreneurs are
dependent on competent partners who can be trusted as they are unable to involve
themselves completely (Iacobucci and Rosa 2004, 2010). If portfolio entrepreneurs are
unable to find suitable partners, they delay the implementation (Alsos and Kolvereid 1998).
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They take time to transform their weak ties into strong ones and thus build trust so that
they can avoid risk (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986; Larson 1991). This course of action could be
observed in both portfolio entrepreneurs. If entrepreneur A is interested in an opportunity
that a weak tie has presented to him, he will generally discuss it with close friends and uses
his existing network to implement it. He implements this by transforming the weak ties with
the people who presented him with the opportunity into strong ties. It is with these partners
that he implements the projects. The results of the case study confirm previous assumptions
that it is more likely that weak ties give access to new information (De Koning and Muzyka
1996) and that strong ties supply more in-depth information and other resources (Brüderl
and Preisendörfer 1998; Hoang and Antoncic 2003).
For the serial entrepreneurs, the existing team plays a more marginal role in the im-
plementation of opportunities. Both familiarize themselves so deeply with the oppor-
tunity in order to develop the necessary expertise and complement it with partners.
Being a serial entrepreneur means to work on one project at a time; they are not sub-
ject to time constraints comparable to those of a portfolio entrepreneurs. For example,
in the project PB3, the partner and co-founder in the team was a friend. This had more
to do with his friend’s circumstances and the desire to have a partner than it being out
of necessity. For new start-ups, entrepreneur B turns to the old direct project network
if it is a similar project. If the new product has no connection to a previous firm, he will
work with new partners. Serial entrepreneur C chose partners for two subsequent ven-
tures from his Master’s class, but for his last project, he complemented his market ex-
pertise with the technical expertise that he did or could not acquire completely. Still,
the main competences are held or acquired by the lead serial entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs who have access to a high number of resources are more success-
ful than others (McKelvie and Cedere 2001). Habitual entrepreneurs have better
access to resources and can transfer these to the next project (Westhead et al.
2004). In the two cases of portfolio entrepreneurs, material and immaterial re-
sources were regularly transferred from one firm to the next. These are, above all,
financial resources, such as services carried out by departments in the original firm
for the project. The serial entrepreneurs, on the other hand, hardly ever transfer
resources from one project to the next.
Particularly strong ties within a network facilitate access to resources (Brüderl
and Preisendörfer 1998; Hoang and Antoncic 2003). Portfolio entrepreneurs have
the opportunity to transfer their networks directly from one firm to another (Alsos
and Kaikkonen 2004). In the case study, we found that the reputational effect of
the portfolio entrepreneur led to a high indegree of weak ties. The very large weak
tie network is a resource option on its own. The resources mobilized, however, are
strong ties rather than weak ties (Brüderl and Preisendörfer 1998; Hoang and
Antoncic; 2003). By intensifying the relationships, entrepreneur A is able to trans-
form weak ties into strong ones. Thus, he is able to gain access to the necessary
resources. Entrepreneur C relies on trusted ties (interpersonal) who need to find
partners with the necessary competences. In contrast, the serial entrepreneurs in
the cases established a new network for each project. At the beginning of a pro-
ject, they mostly had no knowledge of the industry or the necessary contacts. They
were, though, able to overcome these liabilities within a short space of time. Teams
that are already operational with the necessary competences play thus a greater
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role for the portfolio entrepreneur than for the serial entrepreneur in overcoming
personal time constraints. The attraction of readily available complementary re-
sources and the forging of already operational teams help portfolio entrepreneurs
to overcome personal time constraints.
In the literature on entrepreneurship, reference is often made to the important
role of the social network for the financing of entrepreneurial projects (Hsu 2003,
2004, 2005; McKelvie and Cedere 2001; Shane and Cable 2002). Both the case
studies, however, show two different phenomena. Entrepreneur A has a relatively
stable network for the financing of his projects. Entrepreneur B, on the other hand,
worked with different financers in each firm. The results of the case studies show
a positive connection between the number of implemented opportunities and the
stability of the financial network. For portfolio entrepreneurs, financing is facili-
tated by continuous and ongoing relationships with existing investors. The number
of ventures currently controlled by portfolio entrepreneurs increases the access to
complementary resources (including financing). Serial entrepreneurs can benefit
from signaling effects as (new) investors tend to judge start-up experience as a
positive indicator of entrepreneurial qualities (Hsu 2003, 2004). In this sense, both
serial and portfolio entrepreneurs enjoy a facilitated access to financing compared
to novice entrepreneurs, even if the underlying mechanisms for the two types of
habitual entrepreneurs are different. Serial and portfolio entrepreneurs build and
develop social capital in a different way.
Proposition 4 Serial entrepreneurs are more willing to accept a learning situation both
on the individual and the team level than portfolio entrepreneurs when launching a
new venture.
Proposition 5 Financing of new ventures by habitual entrepreneurs is facilitated by dif-
ferent mechanisms for serial and portfolio entrepreneurs. To attract new investors,
portfolio entrepreneurs rely more on continuous and ongoing financing relationships
(i.e., previous and current investors) while serial entrepreneurs rely more strongly on
signaling effects of entrepreneurship competences compared to novice entrepreneurs.
Conclusion
Due to the prevalence of the phenomenon of the habitual entrepreneur (Ronstadt 1986;
Schollhammer 1991; Ucbasaran et al. 2003a), research on this group makes an import-
ant contribution to understanding entrepreneurship. The literature on the behavior and
performance of habitual entrepreneurs began with anecdotes and assumptions. For
some time now, these have been enhanced by the development and testing of concrete
hypotheses. Our research contributes to the understanding of this phenomenon by an-
swering “how” and “why” questions. We have focused on the early phases of the entre-
preneurial process, such as the identification and implementation of opportunities
based on habitual entrepreneurs’ social capital. While confirming partially existing re-
search, we developed new theoretical insights:
First, portfolio and serial entrepreneurs differ in how they identify and implement op-
portunities. These differences are influenced by differences in building and mobilizing
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social capital. The existence of business groups (a series of current ventures) creates a
series of contingencies but also opportunities for portfolio entrepreneurs. Generally,
portfolio entrepreneurs appear to have larger weak tie networks than serial entrepre-
neurs. Contingencies are time constraints (through commitment to multiple ventures)
and network “maintenance” effects. Personal time constraints mean that portfolio en-
trepreneurs need to have a readily operative team for a new venture project requiring
the attraction of high quality complementary resources. The choice of partners and
their stakes need to be carefully balanced against the existing networks, thus trust rela-
tionships through strong relationships are perceived as a safeguard against harmful de-
ceptions. While previous research considered the role of conflicting relationships
outside the business group (Lechner and Leyronas 2009), our case is on inside rela-
tionships. Thus, non-appropriate choices of partners would trigger negative effects
within the internal relationships of other existing ventures. On the positive side, on-
going financing relationships facilitate new venture financing. Portfolio entrepreneurs
face more constraints because of their higher level of social capital reducing action
autonomy and influencing also their risk attitude. Similarly, their level of risk avoid-
ance should be higher.
Unlike portfolio entrepreneurs, serial entrepreneurs are free of these constraints
while benefitting from entrepreneurial experience effects (compared to novice entrepre-
neurs), especially in terms of financing. This means that serial entrepreneurs can more
easily break with the past and make more radical choices for setting up new ventures.
However, through an increased indegree, portfolio entrepreneurs benefit from their
reputation and business visibility in attracting new ideas and resources that subse-
quently can be transformed into viable resources for new ventures. We could speak of
passive network building or social capital that can be mobilized. Serial entrepreneurs
still need to proactively build networks by increasing the outdegree of contacts and cre-
ating new social capital. Being a serial entrepreneur has no direct and immediate social
capital building effects.
Generally, the case studies advance our understanding of habitual entrepreneurship
by uncovering in more depth how the effects of habitual entrepreneurship act on op-
portunity identification and exploitation. Early views of habitual entrepreneurs’ advan-
tages in carrying over project resources from previous ventures to subsequent ventures
cannot be shared in such a simplistic fashion and are distinct for serial and portfolio
entrepreneurs. It is rather a series of options created through previous ventures that fa-
cilitate new venture creation through social capital. Table 5 summarizes some of the
main differences.
Table 5 Proposed differences between serial and portfolio entrepreneurs
Serial entrepreneurs Portfolio entrepreneurs
Weak tie networks Lower Higher
Degree of change between ventures High—radical Moderate—continuous
Risk-friendliness High Moderate
Uncertainty avoidance Low Moderate
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Second, the group of habitual entrepreneurs is often sub-divided into successful and
non-successful entrepreneurs. The case studies have shown that this is not very realis-
tic. Even long-term successful entrepreneurial activity is no guarantee for the success of
a project. Entrepreneurial success would be better framed as a positive bottom line of a
series of ventures with varying outcomes.
This research has some limitations. There might be some recall biases but the
long-term relationship of one of the authors with the entrepreneurs should
minimize the effects. Case study research draws conclusions from the cases to the
theory. Hypothesis testing of the developed propositions should be a first indica-
tion for future research endeavors. Longitudinal and dynamic network analysis
could investigate how and which elements of entrepreneurial networks are more
proliferate for new venture creation.
Between the lines, it appears that portfolio entrepreneurs are more risk-averse or
at least more risk alert than serial entrepreneurs. In this sense, it is not clear
whether portfolio entrepreneurs have a lower willingness to take risks or whether
they have a higher ability to see risks. Comparative studies could investigate the re-
lationships between risk propensity and risk perception among different types of
habitual entrepreneurs. A similar logic could apply to the learning motivation of
habitual entrepreneurs, which can also be viewed as a form of ambiguity accept-
ance. Serial entrepreneurs appear to be more willing to accept the learning situ-
ation and ambiguity. In conclusion, we hope that our research will stimulate
further research on habitual entrepreneurship.
Methods
The phenomenon of opportunity emergence in general and for different types of habit-
ual entrepreneurs in particular is suffering from a theory deficit; a more in-depth ex-
ploration using qualitative methods is required (Suddaby et al. 2015). Case study
analysis is a suitable choice for answering the “why” and “how” questions in unexplored
areas and for deriving theoretical propositions to explain certain phenomena (Edmond-
son and McManus 2007; Yin 2003). These though have no claim to universal validity
but refer to the case at hand (Schnell et al. 1999), drawing conclusions from the case to
theory (Yin 2003). In this paper, four case studies of experienced habitual entrepreneurs
are examined, following recommendations for comparative case studies (Eisenhardt
1989). The theoretical sampling consisted of two portfolio entrepreneurs and two serial
entrepreneurs. Moreover, one serial and one portfolio entrepreneur were similar in that
they had developed their business over a long period of time (about 20 years) while the
other two had created multiple businesses over a shorter time span. Through this sam-
pling, we wanted to increase the chances of gaining theoretical insights through the de-
tection of uncommon phenomena (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). Two cases are
considered as main cases (one serial and one portfolio entrepreneur) and the other two
as complementing cases. While data collection in itself has been done equally for all
cases, we focus on the two main cases A and B. The two complementary cases are used
to validate the finding of the main cases or to refine the potentially emerging proposi-
tions without needing to represent the data in details. In this sense, we improve the
case design by allowing for sufficient theoretical insight and respond to calls for reason-
able data analysis and succinct case descriptions (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997).
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Semi-structured interview guidelines were used to collect the data of the four habit-
ual entrepreneurs. Interviews were also carried out with people within their social en-
vironment, and their observations were supplemented and verified using secondary
data, e.g., newspaper articles and information from the internet (following Eisenhardt
1989). Overall, 36 interviews were conducted over a 1-year period.
Key concepts
Social capital is created through investment in relationships that lead to valuable re-
sources embedded in social networks that can be mobilized by an individual (Lin
1999). Within the existing literature, networks were described and measured in differ-
ent ways (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Frequently used variables were the size of the
network, the diversity of the actors (Zhao and Aram 1995), the number of connections
of the central actor, centrality, which might not just only be measured by the number
of connections but also by the meaning of the actor according to the access of re-
sources (Hoang and Antoncic 2003), and a special position of an actor as a link be-
tween two networks, so-called bridging ties (Burt 1992).
To gain in-depth insights on habitual entrepreneurs, we developed an original ap-
proach for describing the business partner networks of the entrepreneur. Business part-
ners were understood as those individuals who were actively involved in the execution,
and without whom, the realization of the project would not have been possible. In
addition, the partners who played an important supporting role but were replaceable in
the end will be amassed. These business partners will be sorted by importance and dis-
played in a table. Each partner will be assigned a letter. If a partner was involved in sev-
eral projects, this will be recognizable by the letter. In addition, every partner of
entrepreneur A will be marked by an A index and the partners of entrepreneur B with
a B index. Both tables will therefore show how often the entrepreneurs worked with
which partners and how important these partners were for the execution. The differen-
tiation of the networks and the network stability will become apparent. Alongside these
networks, the number of business partners who held shares in the share capital of the
company and the number of people who could have taken on this role will be consid-
ered. This will show how many alternatives the entrepreneur had for the execution of
the project.
Endnotes
1We use the more neutral term of opportunity emergence or origin. There is an on-
going and unresolved debate about the discovery or creation of opportunities (see, e.g.,
Suddaby et al. 2015). Similar debates have animated marketing scholars for decades in
terms of existing and latent needs (see, e.g., Slater and Narver 1998). Since we are
mainly interested in opportunity emergence and how habitual entrepreneurs act upon
them, and since this is an unexplored area, an a priori restriction to one perspective ap-
pears not to be practical.
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